Beyond the River

Now this is just mean.

Context here.

Farangis Najibullah has a piece at Eurasianet on the growing phenomenon of political debate and discussion in Tajikistan. It’s an interesting read, and I’d only add that the Tajik-language blogosphere is another major contributor to the debate.

According to A Dervish, the Tajik version of Azia Plius is reporting that Sadulloev/Asadullozoda has been sighted in Khorogh–a story that was also picked up by Radio Ozodi:

Some reporters, at the time of Hasan Asadullozoda’s appearance at the city sports field, asked to talk with him, and it appeared that he himself was interested in talking to them, but his security detail prevented the president of “Orionbonk” from talking to the journalists.

Wow, so he’s alive.

Or, it’s his twin brother Hussein. Which might explain why the security detail didn’t want him talking about bank matters.

What makes this all the more interesting is that if he really is alive, he has some explaining to do to a certain judge in London. Turns out that the aluminum case involving RusAL, Norway’s Hydro, and a consortium of exiled Tajik businessmen in London all hinges on Sadulloev.

I think it best to let John Hellmer do most of the heavy lifting when it comes to explaining what the heck is going on with this court case of gigantic proportions (a goodly part of the GDP of Tajikistan is at stake):

The one individual in Tajikistan who knows exactly where the aluminum cash is going, how Hydro is involved, and what Hydro’s executives know of it, is Saduloev. He heads the country’s leading commercial bank, Orienbank; he also controls CDH, a BVI-registered entity listed on Talco’s website as one of its strategic aluminum and alumina trading partners. CDH is one of the parties to the London court case. [CDH is an offshore shell company that controls millions in profits from Talco–IC]

There’s just one little problem with Sadulloev testifying:

Saduloev is at risk in London, for if he is found to be deceiving the High Court, his free movement in and out of the UK may be curtailed and the interbank reputation of Orienbank is likely to be challenged. But there are obvious problems for Saduloev in Dushanbe if, in responding to the questions that have been raised in the court hearings to date, he tells what he knows.

Was he shot to silence him on account of the domestic problem? Has Saduloev urged Rahmon to drop the London case, pay off its costs, and stop the proceedings before he himself, along with Kabirov and others, are interrogated? Did Saduloev attempt to press Rahmon in what Rahmon and his son Rustam judged to be a putsch attempt? Or were the shooting and disappearance contrived by Rahmon, Saduloev and others, in order to make him appear to be alive, but inaccessible all the same?

Now if Sadulloev really is alive, I assume that his refusal to testify would end up resulting in a dismissal of the case Rahmon brought in London, which, in other words, would mean the forfeiture of 5% of Tajikistan’s GDP for nothing.

And by nothing, I mean a complete loss of international stature–for Orionbonk, which could hardly operate if it were perceived to be a funnel for corruption, and for the Rahmon regime itself. Or is it too late already:

Rahmon’s political standing has already been undermined in the two key foreign capitals where he has counted on support - in Oslo, Norway, and in Washington, DC. Despite lobbying by Hydro executives for an official visit by Rahmon to Norway, the Foreign Ministry in Oslo has refused point-blank. US sources in Washington say they “are not currently planning for a presidential visit to the United States”.

If you’ve ever googled ‘Dushanbe’ or ‘Tajikistan’ then you probably already know about the Boulder Dushanbe Teahouse, the website of which looks like it must have been funded by an offshore aluminum scam. Or by wealthy Boulder hippies who need their limited edition Puerh teas. (I can’t pronounce Puerh.)

As a former Boulder resident, back in the day as a hard-core two-year-old who kept it real, I am allowed to make fun.

Imagine my surprise when I opened today’s edition of the local paper and saw this article about the refashioning of the original into something a little more customer-oriented:

His Persian food, says the chef, isn’t exactly authentic, but rather based on traditional recipes. When he decides what to serve, he’s mindful of his audience.

Hence, he makes round balls of kufteh out of chickpeas instead of the traditional beef or lamb. “We like to do a vegetarian option,” says Mendenhall. Kuku, another Persian specialty, Mendenhall describes as “a cross between an omelet and a souffle.” It arrives full of cauliflower, with a cumin-scented yogurt sauce and the house bread, similar to crostini.

Ah yes, the vegetarian option. A common feature on the menu of every Tajikistan teahouse. I suppose the adjective ‘Persian’ is meant to make this all good.

An appetizer of ojama, loin of Spanish tuna, has been cured for days, dried for a few more, then sliced paper thin, its saltiness cut by lemon and olive oil. The fish is garnished with a frisee salad. The signature dessert, gingerbread, is made with tangerine tea and topped with five-spice whipped cream and orange syrup.

I’m basically quoting these lines just to taunt expat friends who are in Dushanbe. Although you might try going to Rohat and putting in a special order with the chef for ojama and frisee salad. And I hear they’re thinking of adding tangerine-tea gingerbread with five-spiced whipped cream and orange syrup to the dessert menu at Delhi Darbar.

And if you’re lucky enough to be sitting at a topchon (the traditional Tajik table), you can nestle against the pillows and peruse the selections in maximum comfort.

In all seriousness, America needs far more tapchans.

The leading Tajik-language blog, Andesha, has an interesting guest post about the recent protest in Khorog. Scroll down the comments section for an English translation.

UPDATE: Lola Olimova of IWPR provides excellent analysis of the Badakhshan protests.

Updated news links at the end of the post.

By way of a Ferghana.ru translation, the Russian newspaper Kommersant Daily reviews the purges of both former friends and foes of Rahmon in various regions of Tajikistan:

Kulob:

The authorities gave the order to Internal Troops to attack the Langariyevs’ household on Tuesday night. Once activists of the Popular Front, the Langariyevs had fought the Islamic opposition, side by side with Emomali Rakhmon, back in the mid-1990s. Not even the elder brother’s death in the civil war saved his family now.

Badakhshan:

Major Tokhir Chorshanbiyev, commander of a Border Detachment in Gorny Badakhshan, was arrested on orders from Dushanbe last year. When informed, his followers took revenge upon the head of the local state security department and authorities were compelled to surrender and release Chorbanshiyev, once a leader of the United Tajik Opposition.

Garm:

A skirmish occurred this February in Garm, a town known as bulwark of the Tajik opposition. Colonel Oleg Zakharchenko, commander of the Interior Ministry’s OMON or special police unit, was killed in the skirmish. Zakharchenko was in Garm on a mission. He was supposed to arrest Colonel Mirzokhoja Akhmadov, chief of the local Organized Crime Department, who had fought against Rakhmon in the civil war. Akhmadov and his cohorts opened up on the OMON officers come to take them into custody. Zakharchenko was killed and four officers accompanying him were wounded. Akhmadov, in the meantime, retained his job as though nothing untoward happened. That was the last time official Dushanbe tried to restrain the powerful colonel.

Former members of the post-civil-war coalition:

Rakhmon did purge the ruling circles of powerful allies over the last several years. Ex-commander of the Presidential Guard, Gafor Mirzoyev, and former interior minister, Yakub Salimov (both from Kulyab), were tried, convicted, and imprisoned. Nor were former leaders of the United Tajik Opposition forgotten. The Tajik regime has a long memory. It had Mirzokhoji Nizomov (formerly of the Customs Committee) and Mahmadruzi Iskandarov (Democratic Party leader and Tajikgaz ex-director) seized, tried, and sentenced to imprisonment.

And let’s not forget, Rahmon’s own brother-in-law (his wife’s brother):

The conflict flared up on May 1 when both were accompanying Rakhmon on a visit to the town of Yavan. Whatever happened between the nephew and the uncle remains unclear, but the former drew a firearm and shot the latter. Wounded in the neck, Sadullayev was rushed to a clinic in Germany where he died a week later. Officially, his death was never confirmed. All of Dushanbe is therefore involved in wild speculations.

No one wants conflict in Tajikistan, but that certainly looks like the direction Rahmon wants to go.

Update: Ominous analysis by Reuters on the danger of Tajikistan becoming a failed state; Eurasianet on discontent in Kulob; and the AP on food shortages.

Vadim of neweurasia has passed along an AsiaPlus story about a frightening-sounding gunfight in the southern city of Kulob [ru]. He says that the story of the gunfight has put everyone there on edge. Government forces stormed the compound of Suhrob Langariev, a former Popular Front leader, on the pretext that he possessed stores of heroin and weapons (basically, a competitor for the business that the government almost certainly enjoys a near-monopoly on).

This comes in the context of a general push by the Rahmon regime to eliminate former civil-war rivals, even resorting to the kind of violence Tajikistan hasn’t seen in a while. It also comes at a low point for the stability of the Rahmon and Bros. family enterprise.

Update: For Tajik readers, Tojvar at Andesha picks up the story and asks seven tough questions. Also, Reuters has reprinted the story from AsiaPlus.

I’ve asked for permission from Tojvar to reprint his post in Tajik from the blog Andesha (Thought), which judging by the comments has a pretty good readership. I’m not choosing it because it proves anything, but because it might be representative of the kind of conversations taking place around kitchen tables all over Tajikistan.

Hassan Sadullayev (Asadullayev) is the luckiest person in the world. Thousands upon thousands of people are looking for news about him every day, and are discussing whether or not he’s still alive. Several news and analytical sites are keeping at the ready different kinds of articles depending on the situation. Some are probably preparing their little black cameras to take a picture of him, and other people are counting the days until the rumors are shown to be true or false.

If he shows up tomorrow on the central avenue tomorrow, or on TV, I’ll be the first to send him my congratulations, and I’ll pronounce him the winner of the contest for the biggest free publicity campaign ever.

But the days are passing, and word is reaching the farthest corners of the earth, but there’s no news from Tajikistan. In comparison, more than 100 trustworthy outlets have published about the disappearance of Sadullayev. Even you, dear guests of Andesha (Darius’s term) have made our posts about Hassan Sadullayev the most-read posts in the last 3 days. Enjoy. It’s probably not for no reason. History is our witness that the death of some people have been concealed for various purposes and for various amounts of time. You probably know better than me what the reason (or reasons) is for Sadullayev.

The Tajik saying “an advised lie is better than a truth that sows discord” belongs to the greatest aphorisms of world wisdom. It is amazing that if they stole everything from us and documented it in their name, this wisdom would remain safe from the vicissitudes of history and it would all be ascribed to ourselves. One Russian-language press has made use of our very own national idea. And a footnote is given: “Entsiklopedia aforizmov,” Moscow, 1998, 249. According to the enemy of the wise, the home-wrecker knows when he will hit us and with what. But our friendly wise man, Friedrich Nietzsche, who had special fondness for Tajiks and Zarathustra, writes:

“A person who does not intend to lie also benefits from his not lying.”

Now for those who have a direct connection to all these rumors and stories, you should judge for yourselves whether the benefit comes from lying or from not lying. But I will return to what you have written in the comments to “The Tale of Rustam and Hassan Sadullayev,” some of which were published and some of which, according to the writers’ wishes, were not printed.

My dear reader who is apparently carrying out the demands of his job in the corridors of the Tajik government writes with complete faith: “the public news media of Tajikistan, whatever you say, have spoken freely and write that Sadullayev is alive and well.”

Lord knows, he might be in perfect health. I personally in no way wish for his death, and I’ve written that if there has been a crime, the criminal has to answer before the law, not in a “takedown.” But dear Reader, if you’ve paid attention, everything written in the Tajik press has but one source: Sadullayev’s assistant, who spoke to Radio Ozodi. This station, as far as I know, is located in Prague, Czech Republic, and according to what they have written, they spoke to Umed Davlatzoda by telephone. It’s well known that the telephone system of Tajikistan isn’t a videophone, so that they could see the face of the respected Davlatzoda, in order to see if she was speaking the truth. Personally, I’m with this gentleman [quoted in RFE/RL]:

“Thank god, he’s in good health. He’s at work and god willing, his work is making progress.”

I don’t know how religious or spiritual this gentleman is, or if he is currently speaking in the style of the country with such exclamations, but when a person uses two religious terms in a row, it seems like he’s speaking from his soul. Maybe he was going to say “Verily to god” but under threat of getting his teeth smashed in he changed it to “Thank god”? But your very words, one of my dear Readers, are very significant:

“Personally I also saw him up close on May 8 and 10.”

So this gets rid of all suspicions. Only you didn’t write where or in what condition. Because it’s possible to see a person in the hospital up close, and also in a coffin. Forgive me, I’m not mocking, but rather I want for you to write where and in what condition you saw him, god grant you a long life. Because my friends and acquaintances aren’t talking anymore. One of them is waiting on a paper to be signed by Sadullayev, but every time he calls Orienbank, they say that the director is busy and he’ll sign it tomorrow. Does it really take 17 days to sign a paper, or just a few moments?

Another reader writes that the upper management of the bank is well aware of the events, but they’re not telling anyone, because “a rich man doesn’t give away his secrets.” Not a single person has seen a sign of the director in at least ten days, i.e., no one has seen him get out of his car and come to work or leave work.

The learned Darius asks these engaging questions:

“Dear readers, it seems like you are more in the know than me. I don’t believe these stories, but I have a few questions. Why didn’t Rahmon attend the May 9 celebration? For the first time in the history of our independent country. Why didn’t Hassan Sadullayev travel to Kazakhstan with Rahmon? Why is the state not trying to disprove the rumors by showing the healthy body of Sadullayev to the people? At least on the pretense of a meeting or something.”

I don’t have anything to add to these questions, besides changing slightly the words of Anatole France, who I believe said that only women and doctors know to what extent a lie is necessary. So that people won’t accuse me, a great lover of the gentle sex, of being anti-feminist, I’ll change the word “women” to “no-good politicians.” Thus it becomes:

“Only no-good politicians and doctors know to what extent a lie is necessary.”

There’s a murder at the end of this post, so keep reading despite the boring business details.

With a tip of the hat to the classic Russian-dubbed Mexican soap opera, let’s go back and review last week’s post about the aluminum court case that’s making a big sucking sound on the Tajik economy:

Now, according to an excellent article in Asia Times, we learn that Rahmon has squandered more than 5% of the country’s entire GDP on legal fees against former partners in Tajikistan’s aluminum projects, as well as a Norwegian company called Hydro that handled complex commodity transactions for Tajikistan using a shell corporation in the Virgin Islands.

Well, there have been a couple of developments since John Helmer reported that the Tajik government, in the broad daylight of British jurisdiction, has spend upwards of $120 million on suing his former Talco (Tajik Aluminum Company) partners.

Now he’s reporting, in a modified reprint of the the original article in Mineweb, that the IMF has some egg on its face. While it did find out about the stolen $40 mil, its audits seem to overlooked $120 mil:

Masood Ahmed, the IMF spokesman, was asked by Mineweb how the IMF had managed to miss the expenditure of up to 4% of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product on the London and British Virgin Islands litigation, which Talco has pursued for the past three years. He declined to say. Ahmed also refused to say if the IMF has verified whether Hydro is a contractual beneficiary of the Talco litigation in London and elsewhere.

I suppose we would all decline to say in that situation. But the important thing is, we know now.

Also, he reports that US Ambassador Tracy Jacobson is officially miffed and that we’re going to, like, totally look into this matter:

Tracey Jacobson, the US Ambassador to Tajikistan, today told Mineweb she “would hope that all audits would be as complete as possible.” Official intervention by the US in support of the IMF’s mission to Dushanbe, and in the financial crisis now gripping Tajikistan, is unusual.

What is this all about? Well, it seems that the Tajik government, which is basically the owner of the Tajik aluminum company Talco, had a nice little deal set up. Tajikistan is good at making aluminum, but it doesn’t have alumina, which it needs to import to make the aluminum. Makes sense, and seems like a nice way to turn a profit.

However, apparently what they were really doing was setting up the alumina-aluminum transactions in such a way so as to make it look like the company was taking losses, when in fact the profits were being diverted into off-shore bank accounts with the help of a Norwegian company, Hydro. We all know what off-shore bank accounts are for: they’re for dictators who need to hide their dirty money from their shivering, hungry populations.

Here’s how Helmer summarized it back in March:

Hydro appears to sell alumina to Talco, and Talco appears to sell aluminum to Hydro - then appearances are deceiving. The court presentation of the documents shows that, according to a scheme of tolling the raw materials for processing at contrived prices, Talco receives alumina from Hydro and gives it to CDH. CDH then contracts it for processing by the smelter and receives the metal back in exchange. CDH then sells the same metal back to Talco at the market price, and Talco sells it to Hydro at a loss.

The combination of input and output prices leaves Hydro with a profit on its alumina and its aluminum. However, the biggest profit is reserved for CDH, leaving the plant in Tajikistan with what is described in court as “a huge loss on the entire transaction”. This diversion is done with the full knowledge of Hydro.

Fine, so the Norwegian government is not a big fan of their companies going around setting up corrupt financial schemes for small-time thugs who happen to run countries. They told Hydro to cut off the deal, which they did, which Tajikistan sued them in a British court for, which is why we even know any of this because the court filings are public there (as opposed to say in Tajik courts.)

That would be fine, too, except for the fact that not only did Hydro and Talco (i.e., the Tajik government) have a scheme to squirrel away millions of dollars offshore, but now the court case, which has lasted a while now, has cost the Tajik government $120 million dollars. Or about 5% of Tajikistan’s GDP.

I’ve done a very basic calculation, so bear with me, I could be totally wrong. The aluminum industry of Tajikistan, according to reliable sources at wikipedia, made up 40% of Tajikistan’s industrial output, and industry makes up 28% of the total GDP. So, we’re looking at just over $1.07 billion a year, if my method isn’t faulty. That at least gives as a ballpark, upper limit figure for how much money is at stake if the whole scheme collapses on Rahmon.

Now for the murder.

Last week, Rahmon’s son Rustam shot his uncle, Rahmon’s brother-in-law, Hassan Sadullayev. The latter died on an emergency trip to Germany for treatment.

Ahem.

Rahmon is not totally psyched to have this news reported. He’s threatened to shoot anyone who divulges details of the murder publicly. Nice.

This is certainly not the first murder in Central Asian politics, and there have been signs that we were leading up to this. A short while ago, the radio station that Sadullayev owned was shut off. Bad sign.

Also, he ran Orien Bank, a very big bank by Tajik standards. Don’t be a big banker in Tajikistan.

Eurasianet reports that it might have been the case that Rahmon’s daughter was trying to wrest control of the bank from Sadullayev, and that ultimately sparked the shooting, but I am intrigued by Khurosonzamin’s repost of a September article about the rising star of Sadullayev:

According to well-informed sources, Rahmon himself sees a successor in his brother’s wife Hassan Sadullayev. He is the director of the largest bank in the country, Orientbank, and the head of the offshore company CDH, which has exclusive trading rights to the Tajik aluminum factory.

Oh, look, there’s that offshore company that handled the theft of millions, maybe hundreds of millions of dollars for Rahmon and Bros. Note also that this is mentioned in the same breath as the post-Rahmon era succession.

Update: RFE/RL has a more circumspect report, neither verifying nor disproving that the murder of Sadullayev has even taken place. They quote some loyal employees who claim that they saw him “just a half-hour ago” and that “thank god, he is in good health.” However, there’s no public sign of him and he didn’t accompany Rahmon to Kazakhstan (apparently he usually does come on regional visits), nor did Rahmon attend the Victory Day parade this year for the first time ever.

Let me start by saying that Tajikistan is a wonderful country. Its people are generous, kind, and hospitable, and its natural beauty is second to none.

But its government is a wreck, a gang of incompetent thieves.

In recent months the Tajik government has spent quite a bit of energy on going after “corruption”–you might have heard, if you’re living in Tajikistan, of the dubious action initiated against the owner of Dushanbe’s most successful grocery store chain, Orima.

Also, at the same time as the country was suffering its worst energy crisis ever, the parliament was debating whether or not to rescue the nation from the scourge of right-side-steering vehicles. They did.

Now, according to an excellent article in Asia Times, we learn that Rahmon has squandered more than 5% of the country’s entire GDP on legal fees against former partners in Tajikistan’s aluminum projects, as well as a Norwegian company called Hydro that handled complex commodity transactions for Tajikistan using a shell corporation in the Virgin Islands.

Yes, you read that right. Five percent of Tajikistan’s GDP, wasted:

Herbert Smith, one of the largest-billing of British law firms, has been forced to reveal this month in the High Court in London that it is charging the Tajikistan government more than US$100 million for a three-year court claim ordered by Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov (Rahmon). Rahmon’s targets are a group of aluminum traders and managers, now based in London, who were ousted from the Tajikistan Aluminum Plant (TadAZ, Talco) after getting too close to the president’s interest in Tajikistan’s principal industry.

The fee numbers and estimates were part of the disclosures that were tabled in a High Court hearing on April 15 before Mr Justice Tomlinson. Herbert Smith is the law firm acting for the Tajik smelter (Talco), which is wholly owned by the Tajikistan government and directly supervised by Rahmon. The estimate of costs from Herbert Smith (aka Herbies in London legal slang) also covers barristers’ fees, which include those of Murray Rosen QC, who is acting for Talco on Herbies’ instructions.

Additional case-fee charges of 10 million pounds (US$20 million) have also been revealed. These are being run up by a British Virgin Islands-registered company called CDH, which is a cutout in the complex aluminum trading arrangements devised by Rahmon’s government between Talco and its Norwegian supplier and partner, Hydro Aluminum. CDH is being represented in the High Court by Osborne Clarke.

The total of $120 million represents 5.2% of the gross domestic product of Tajikistan, the poorest of the former Soviet Union member states, in 2005. That was when Rahmon and the aluminum plant launched the court case against Avaz Nazarov, a Tajik national, who had traded with the plant until Rahmon ousted him in late 2004.

This all has a lot to do with a) the best natural resource Tajikistan has, aluminum; and b) the deal between RusAL, the Russian aluminum company, and the Tajik government to build a new aluminum plant as well as to complete the Rogun Hydroelectic Dam. (That dam that the Tajik government is now begging for private donations for.)

It’s also in the context of the recent revelation that the Tajik government basically stole a $79mil loan from the IMF intended for poverty reduction, which they were busted for.

Tajik citizens can find a perverse kind of vindication for all of their suspicions that the Rahmon gang is picking their pockets. In a court decision related to the aluminum controversy, a London judge called TadAZ claims of victimhood nonsense, and laid the blame squarely on Rahmon and Bros.:

Ruling in that case, Justice Morison of the High Court’s Queens Bench Division wrote, in an opinion dated May 18, 2006, that Talco/TadAZ “are not the victims of fraud, they have been the perpetrators of it in this litigation … [Talco] has been involved in deliberate attempts to mislead the [Arbitration] Tribunal and have committed acts which in this jurisdiction are serious crimes [forgery and attempting to gain a pecuniary advantage by fraud]”.

Isabel Gorst, a reporter for Financial Times, writes today that Tajikistan is a “Muslim nation bordering Iran and Afghanistan.” Ah, the perils of being a Moscow-based reporter asked to say things about strange little Muslim nations… I tip my hat to Sue for this link.

The content of the article, that Tajikistan’s government is begging for donations from private citizens to complete the Rogun Dam project, I’ll leave without comment. IWPR, who actually knows about Central Asia, gives a good background to the dam and water issues in the region generally in this 2006 article.